Amnesic patients and control Ss read the names of famous and nonfamous persons. Subsequently, both groups were more likely to designate a name as famous if it had been encountered previously. The facilitatory effect of prior presentation was similar for amnesic patients and control Ss and similar for famous and nonfamous names. For amnesic patients, the effect occurred despite severely impaired recognition memory for the names. In a 2nd experiment, recombining the first and last names that had been presented together did not diminish the facilitatory effect of prior presentation, which indicates that the effect does not depend on forming an association between first and last names. The results show that nondeclarative (implicit) memory can support the acquisition of information that is specific (e.g., names of persons) and that has no preexisting representation (e.g., nonfamous names).
An important and recently appreciated fact about the organization of memory is that memory is not a single entity but is composed of multiple processes or systems. One compelling source of evidence for this idea comes from studies of human amnesia (Moscovitch, 1982; Schacter, 1987; Squire, 1982; Weiskrantz. 1987) . Amnesic patients are severely impaired on conventional recall and recognition tests that assess memory for recently encountered facts and events. Such tests have been considered to depend on declarative memory (also termed explicit, conscious, or representational memory; Cohen. 1984; Squire, 1982 Squire, , 1986 ). Yet, amnesic patients can sometimes learn and remember normally. In these cases, experience appears to change performance without requiring conscious recollection of any past event or memory content. The learning is nondeclarative (also termed implicit or nonconscious; Squire & Zola-Morgan. 1988) , and it is independent of the brain structures and connections that are damaged in amnesia. Intact performance in amnesia has now been observed in several kinds of tasks, including tasks of skill learning (Brooks & Baddeley. 1976; Cohen & Squire, 1980; Nissen & Bullemer. 1987; Squire & Frambach, 1990) , conditioning (Daum, Channon, & Canavan, 1989) , and priming (Shimamura. 1986 : Tulving & Schacter, 1990 .
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presented words (Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985) , and they exhibit intact acquisition and retention of text-specific reading skills, that is, facilitatory effects on reading speed that are specific to previously presented text (Moscovitch, Winocur, & McLachlan, 1986; Musen, Shimamura, & Squire, 1990) . Amnesic patients also show a normal shift of preference following exposure to novel melodies (Johnson, Kim, & Risse, 1985) and normal adaptation-level effects (Benzing & Squire, 1989) . In the latter case, lifting and judging weights with one hand influenced judgments of heaviness when weights were subsequently lifted with the other hand.
The possibility has also been investigated in amnesic patients that nondeclarative memory might support not only the acquisition of very specific information but also the acquisition of information that has no preexisting representation. Currently, there is little direct evidence to support this idea. For example, in amnesia, perceptual priming, wordcompletion priming, and lexical-decision priming have all been reported to occur for words but not for pronounceable nonwords (Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, & Wolbarst, 1985; Diamond & Rozin, 1984; Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990 ). Novel melodies did produce normal shifts in preference in amnesic patients (Johnson et al., 1985) but, as discussed previously , these effects might depend on preexisting representations of melodic sequences. A more decisive test would determine whether amnesic patients exhibit normal preference shifts following presentation of random sequences of tones. Accordingly, when intact effects of prior encounters have been demonstrated in amnesic patients, the effects have often been interpreted as depending on the activation of preexisting, unitized representations rather than on the establishment of new ones (for further discussion of this issue, see Schacter, 1985 Schacter, , 1987 . These findings notwithstanding, recent studies of normal subjects suggest that even single encounters with novel material can influence behavior implicitly just as familiar material does. For example, normal subjects exhibited priming of unfamiliar visual objects that was independent of recognition 106 memory performance (Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990) . In another study, normal subjects improved their ability to reproduce novel line patterns independently of their ability to recognize the patterns as familiar (Musen & Treisman, 1990) . Finally, after five very brief (1 ms) exposures to geometric shapes, subjects altered their judgments about various aspects of the shapes despite being able to recognize them as familiar (Bonnano & Stillings, 1986; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987) . These findings suggest that performance can be influenced by prior events independently of declarative memory, even when no preexisting representation of the presented material is available (for further discussion, see Schacter, 1991) . With few exceptions, these paradigms have not yet been explored systematically with amnesic patients (see Schacter, Cooper. Tharan, & Rubens, 1991 ; also see Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, & Corkin, 1990 , for a single-case study).
Another recent study of normal subjects underscores the specific influence that single encounters with novel material can exert on performance. The phenomenon of interest is that subjects are more likely to judge a name as famous if the name has been encountered recently (Neely & Payne, 1983) . This facilitatory effect is dissociable from declarative memory in that dividing attention during initial presentation of names markedly reduced subsequent recognition memory performance but had no effect on fame judgments (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) . Accordingly, the fame judgment task should be a useful test of nondeclarative memory.
Amnesia provides a useful way to explore the scope and limits of nondeclarative memory because in amnesia there is little possibility that conscious memory strategies will contaminate performance. Thus, a finding of intact performance by amnesic patients provides particularly strong evidence that a phenomenon is independent of declarative memory and independent of the brain system that is damaged in amnesia.
The purpose of our experiments was to determine whether nondeclarative memory can support the acquisition of novel material that has no preexisting representation. Accordingly, we investigated in amnesic patients and normal subjects the effects of prior presentation of names on subsequent fame judgments, using a modification of the paradigm developed by Jacoby et al. (1989) . In Experiment 1 we asked whether amnesic patients would exhibit an increased tendency to judge names as famous following a single presentation of the names. If nondeclarative memory can support the acquisition of novel information, then the fame judgment effect should be as large for amnesic patients as for normal subjects. In addition, the effect should be as large for nonfamous names as for famous names.
Experiment 1

Method
Subjects first read aloud the first and last names of 30 famous and 30 nonfamous people. They then made yes-no judgments about the fame of 40 names from the study list, which were presented with 40 new names. Finally, they took a yes-no recognition memory test for 20 names from the study list, which were presented with 20 new names.
Subjects
Amnesic patients. We tested 10 amnesic patients (Table 1 ). all of whom had been studied in our laboratory repeatedly during the past few years. Six of the patients (4 men and 2 women) had alcoholic KorsakofTs syndrome. These 6 patients had all participated in either a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study (Squire, Amaral, & Press, 1990) or in a quantitative computerized tomography (CT) study (Shimamura, Jernigan, & Squire, 1988) . These studies demonstrated marked reductions in the volume of the mammillary nuclei, reduced thalamic density, and frontal atrophy. 57.2 Note. WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised; WMS-R = Wechsler Memory ScaleRevised. The WAIS-R and each of the five indexes of the WMS-R yield a mean score of 100 in the normal population, with a standard deviation of 15. The WMS-R does not provide scores for subjects who score below 50. Therefore, the two scores below 50 were scored as 50 for computing a group mean. Korsakoff = alcoholic KorsakofPs syndrome.
Of the 4 other patients (3 men and 1 woman), 2 have bilateral hippocampal pathology as identified with MRI (patients LM and JL, in Press, Amaral, & Squire, 1989 Squire, & Amaral, 1986) suggest that AB is also likely to have sustained damage to the hippocampal formation. The fourth patient, MG, became amnesic in 1986 following a bilateral thalamic infarction, which was confirmed by MRI. Because our study was concerned with the overall performance of amnesic patients, the patients were treated as a single group.
The 10 amnesic patients averaged 59.9 years of age at the time of the study and 12.9 years of education. They had an average Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) IQ of 104.9. Individual IQ and Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised index (WMS-R) scores appear in Table 1 . Scores for other memory tests appear in Table 2 . Note that the scores on the word-recall test in Table 2 are above zero because on this test of immediate recall, several items can be retrieved from immediate memory, which is intact in amnesia. In addition, the mean score on the Dementia Rating Scale (Mattis, 1976) was 132 points (max. = 144. range = 119-143), with most of the points lost on the memory subportion of the test (6.7 points). The average score on the Boston Naming Test was 54 points (max. = 60, range = 48-57). Their immediate and delayed (12-min) recall of a short prose passage (Gilbert. Levee, & Catalano, 1968 ) averaged 5.6 and 0 segments, respectively. Scores for normal subjects on these same tests can be found in Janowsky. Shimamura, Kritchevsky, and Squire, (1989) and Squire. Amaral. and Press (1990) .
Healthy control subjects. The 14 control subjects (10 men and 4 women) were either employees or volunteers at the San Diego Veterans Affairs Medical Center. They averaged 61.3 years of age, 13.8 years of education, WAIS-R subtest scores of 21.3 for Information (compared with 19.8 for the amnesic patients) and 53.3 for Vocabulary (compared with 55.5 for the amnesic patients). Immediate and delayed (12-min) recall of a short prose passage (Gilbert et al., 1968) averaged 6.5 and 5.6 segments, respectively.
Materials
A list of 120 names was constructed, consisting of the first and last names of 60 people who became moderately well known during one of three decades (the 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s) , with the first and last names of 60 other people taken from a local telephone directory. The famous names were selected so that they had, on average, about a .50 probability of being identified as famous. Each nonfamous name was selected to match a famous name with respect to length of the first and last name, gender of the first name, and ethnic origin of the last name. First names ranged from very common (e.g., John, Linda) to very uncommon (e.g., Kyle, Annabel). Famous and nonfamous names were similar with respect to the commonness of the first name; frequency of occurrence in print (Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971) = 28.7 per million versus 22.3 per million, f(59) = 1.01, p > .10. Examples of the 60 famous names were Leo Buscaglia, Mary Decker, Leon Jaworski, and Olga Korbut. The matched nonfamous names were Anthony Pignatanza, Christine Eitel, Fritz Bernoski, and Emia Lekovic.
Each of the 120 names was assigned randomly to one of six sets with the constraint that a nonfamous name had to enter the same set as the famous name to which it was matched. In addition, each set contained approximately equal numbers of famous names from each decade (the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s) . Each of the six 20-name sets (consisting of 10 famous and 10 nonfamous names) could serve in the study phase (3 sets, 60 names), or as new items in the test of fame judgment (2 sets, 40 names), or as new items in the test of recognition memory (1 set, 20 names). Six different arrangements of these 20-name sets were then prepared so that for every subgroup of 6 subjects, 
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Word recall (Osterrieth, 1944; max. score = 36) . The average score for copying the figure was 26.4, a normal score (Kritchevsky, Squire, & Zouzounis, 1988) . The paired-associates score is the number of word pairs recalled on three successive trials (max. score = 10/trial). The word recall score is the percentage of words identified correctly across five successive study-test trials (Rey, 1964) . The word recognition score is the percentage of words identified correctly by yes-no recognition test across five successive study-test trials. The score for words and faces is based on a 24-hr recognition test of 50 words or 50 faces (modified from Warrington, 1984 ; max. score = 50, chance = 25). The mean scores for normal subjects shown for these tests are from Squire and Shimamura (1986) . each 20-name set appeared three times in the study phase, twice as new items in the fame judgment test, and once as new items in the recognition test. In the study phase, the fame judgment test, and the recognition test, the order of presentation of names was random, with the constraint that no more than three names of any one type (i.e., old famous, new famous, old nonfamous, or new nonfamous) were presented consecutively.
Procedure
Experiment 1 began with a study phase, in which 60 names were presented as a test of pronunciation. Subjects were told that they would see the names of people and that they should try to pronounce each name aloud as quickly and accurately as possible. No mention was made of the fact that some of the names were famous. Names were presented in capital letters on a computer screen. For the study phase, the 60 names appeared on the computer screen one at a time (2 s per name with a 2-s pause between names). When a subject mispronounced a name, the examiner provided the correct pronunciation. Subjects mispronounced an average of 18.6% famous names and 26.7% nonfamous names during the study phase. (Excluding mispronounced names from the data analysis did not alter the findings in any phase of the experiment). To make the orienting task credible, each subject's voice was recorded with a tape recorder, which was placed in the subject's view on top of the computer monitor. No further use was made of the recordings.
At the completion of the study phase, subjects were given instructions for the fame judgment test. Subjects were told that some of the names that they had just studied were the names of famous people. They were then told that they would next see a series of names one at a time and that some were the names of moderately famous people. Their task was to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether a name was or was not the name of a famous person. It was further explained that they were not required to know the circumstances of anyone's fame but only to decide whether each name was famous or not famous.
Immediately after the instructions were given (which took about 5 min), subjects saw 80 names, one at a time. Forty of the names (20 famous and 20 nonfamous names) had appeared on the study list, and 40 (20 famous and 20 nonfamous names) had not appeared previously in the experiment. Each name remained on the computer screen until the subject made his or her decision. Subjects registered their fame judgments by pressing keys on the computer keyboard. A key press with the index finger of one hand indicated a judgment of famous, and a key press with the index finger of the other hand indicated a judgment of nonfamous. Pressing a third key caused the next name to appear. The famous judgment key was assigned to the preferred hand for half the subjects and to the nonpreferred hand for half the subjects. The decision made for each name and the response time were recorded.
The 40-name recognition memory test began immediately after the fame judgment test. Subjects were given a list of the 10 famous and 10 nonfamous names from the study list that had not appeared in the fame judgment test, with 10 new famous and 10 new nonfamous distractor items. The names were typed in two columns on a single page. Subjects were asked to place a F(for yes) in front of each name that they recognized from the study list, and an N (for no) in front of each name that they did not recognize from the study list.
Results
The main finding was that both normal subjects and amnesic patients were more likely to designate a name as famous if that name had recently been studied (Figure 1) . The probability of judging a name as famous if it had not been encountered before (baseline rate) was similar for control subjects (famous = 51%, nonfamous = 9%) and amnesic patients (famous = 55%, nonfamous = 14%). For names that had been studied previously, the probability of judging a name as famous increased for both control subjects (famous = 62%, nonfamous = 17%) and amnesic patients (famous = 67%, nonfamous = 28%). Statistical analysis confirmed these impressions. A threeway (Group x New/Old x Famous/Nonfamous) analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant effect of prior study, f( 1, 22) = 41.2, /; < .001, MS C = 73.6, but no effect of group, F(l, 22) = 1.57, p > .20, MS, = 555.3, and no interactions (Fs < 1). Famous names were more likely to be judged famous than nonfamous names, F(l, 22) = 115.84, p < .001, MS, = 361.1. Within each subject group, famous names that had been studied were more likely to be judged famous than famous names that had not been studied; control subjects, /(13) = 4.28. p< .01; amnesic patients, ;(9) = 3.09, p < .05. The same was true for nonfamous names; control subjects, /(13) = 3.15./?<.01; amnesic patients, t(9) = 3.03, p<.05.
A signal detection analysis was also carried out by using unbiased measures of discriminability (d') and bias (($), (Green & Swets, 1966) . For each subject, values of d' and (3 for new and old names were computed from the proportion of hits (judging a famous name as famous) and false alarms (judging a nonfamous name as famous). When the proportion of hits or false alarms for an individual subject was 0 or 1,0 was replaced by 1/(2A') and 1 was replaced by 1 -l/(2N), where A' is the number of trials in which a particular item was presented (Bock & Jones, 1968) . The ability to discriminate (d' ± SE.M) between famous and nonfamous names was similar for control subjects (new names, d' = 1.48 ± .12; old names, d' = 1.36 ± .18) and amnesic patients (new names, d' = 1.25 ± .26: old names, d' = 1.22 ± .26). A two-way ANOVA (Group x New/Old) revealed no significant effects (all Fs < 1). However, prior study did lower the criterion (0) that subjects used for judging whether a name was famous or nonfamous. This effect was similar for control subjects and amnesic patients (controls: new names, /S = 3.19 ± .51; old names, (i = 1.68 ± .29: amnesics: new names, /} = 2.48 ± .47; old names. fH = 1.44 ± .25). Because of positive skew, statistical analyses of these data were based on log transformations of the values. A two-way ANOVA (Group x New/Old) confirmed the effect of prior study. F(l, 22) = 21.71, p < .001, MS,. = .01. and revealed no effect of group, F( 1, 22) < 1, MS C = .06, and no interaction (F < 1, MS C = .01).
Response times for correct fame judgments are shown in Table 3 . A three-way (Group x New/Old x Famous/Nonfamous) ANOVA showed a significant Fame x New/Old interaction, F(l. 22) = 8.53. p« .01, MS, = 113, 543. There were no effects of group, prior study, or fame, and no other interactions (fs < L95.ps > .10). The interaction was due to the fact that subjects were slower to identify new famous names than old famous names, 2,311 ms versus 2,017 ms, f(23) = 2.80, p < .01, but faster to reject new nonfamous names than old nonfamous names, 2,294 ms versus 2,419 ms, /(23) = 2.66. p < .05. Although the amnesic patients and the control subjects exhibited a similar pattern of response times, separate analysis showed that the interaction (Famous/ Nonfamous x New/Old) was significant for the control subjects (p< .01) but not for the amnesic patients (p> .10). The results were identical when the statistical analyses were based on log transformations of response times. Figure 2 shows the performance on the recognition memory test (correct hits plus correct rejections). The control subjects scored much better than the amnesic patients for both famous names, t(22) = 3.64, p < .01, and nonfamous names, t(22) = 7.45, p< .001. Comparisons of d' scores were also significant for famous names (1.66 vs. .52), t(22) = 4.00, p < .01; and nonfamous names (1.68 vs. 56), t{22) = 3.88, p < .01.
Discussion
Control subjects and amnesic patients had the same baseline rate of fame judgments and the same increase in fame judgments after reading a list of famous and nonfamous names. The facilitatory effect was similar for famous and nonfamous names (for control subjects: 10.7% and 8.2%, respectively; for amnesic patients: 12.0% and 13.6%, respectively). The signal detection analysis indicated, as one would expect, that the facilitation occurred because prior exposure reduced the bias against calling a name famous, not because it changed the ability to discriminate between famous and nonfamous names. The results show that the effect of prior presentation on the judgment of fame can be supported by nondeclarative memory and that this effect readily occurs for material for which there is unlikely to be a preexisting representation (i.e., nonfamous names). Experiment 2 asks whether the prior exposure effect for nonfamous names observed in Experiment 1 reflects the formation of a novel association between the first and last name of each stimulus item. Alternatively, the effect observed in Experiment 1 could be carried primarily by the last name. Normal subjects were tested as in Experiment 1, except that half of the old nonfamous names presented during the fame judgment test were constructed by recombining the first and last names that had appeared together during the study phase. We reasoned that if an association was formed between the first and last names of each nonfamous person, then recombining first and last names should eliminate the facilitatory effect of prior presentation on fame judgments. Alternatively, if the facilitatory effect is carried by the last name, then recombining first and last names should not reduce the fame judgment effect.
Experiment 2
Method Subjects
Twenty control subjects (8 men and 12 women) were tested, none of whom had participated in Experiment 1. They were either employees or volunteers at the San Diego Veterans Affairs Medical Center or they were recruited from the University of California, San Diego, retirement community. As a group they averaged 60.9 years of age, 14.9 years of education, and WAIS-R subtest scores of 23.1 for Information and 58.5 for Vocabulary. Immediate and delayed (12-min) recall of a short prose passage (Gilbert et al., 1968 ) averaged 7.6 and 6.2 segments, respectively.
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli were the same 120 names (60 famous and 60 nonfamous names) that were used in Experiment 1. The study phase, the test of fame judgment, and the recognition memory test were given as in Experiment 1. The study phase was composed of 60 names (30 famous and 30 nonfamous names) presented one at a time. Subjects mispronounced an average of 6.0% of the famous names and 12.7% of the nonfamous names during the study phase. (Excluding mispronounced names from the data analysis did not alter any of the findings.) Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 only in that the fame judgment test consisted of 40 famous names (20 new and 20 old) and 40 nonfamous names (20 new, 10 old, and 10 recombined). The 10 recombined names were constructed by recombining first and last names that had appeared together in the study phase (e.g., David Irelan and Steven Elms became Steven Irelan and David Elms). Thus, of the 40 nonfamous names presented in the fame judgment test, 20 were new names, 10 were old names presented as they had appeared in the study phase, and 10 were recombined old names. The recognition test consisted of 10 famous names and 10 nonfamous names from the study phase (which had not appeared in the fame judgment test), presented with 10 new famous and 10 new nonfamous names. No recombined names appeared in the recognition test.
Results
The percentages of famous responses on the fame judgment test are shown in Figure 3 . As in Experiment 1, subjects were more likely to judge a famous or nonfamous name as famous if it had been presented previously. The probability of giving a famous judgment for a name that had not been studied previously (baseline rate) averaged 56% for famous names and 7% for nonfamous names. After study, the probability of a famous response increased to 72% for famous names and to 19% for nonfamous names. These impressions were confirmed by a two-way (New/Old x Famous/Nonfamous), repeated-measures ANOVA. There was an effect of prior study, F(1, 19) = 33.13, p < .001, MS, = 124.7, and fame, F(\. 19)= 168.8\,p< .001. MS, = 300.3, but no interaction (F < 1, MS C = 120.6). The facilitatory effect of prior study on fame judgments was observed both for famous names: new versus old names, t(l9) = 4.36, p < .001, and for nonfamous names: new versus old names, /(19) = 3.81, p < .01.
The new finding in Experiment 2 was that even when the first and last names were recombined. nonfamous names that had been presented previously were more likely to be judged as famous than new names. The probability of a new nonfamous name being judged famous was 7%, but the probability of old nonfamous and old recombined nonfamous names being judged as famous was 19% and 18%, respectively: old versus new, t(\9) = 3.81. p < .01; recombined versus new, /(19) = 3.56, p < .01; recombined versus old, /(19) < 1.
Signal detection analysis confirmed these results. As in Experiment 1, prior study did not affect the discriminability (d J ) between famous and nonfamous names, but it did reduce the criterion (/?) that subjects used for judging a name to be famous: for d'\ new = 1.69 ± .13, old = 1.61 ± .16, recombined = 1.63 ± .16, all /s < 1: for /?: new = 3.49 ± .44, old = 1.77 ± .22, recombined = 1.80 ± .24; new versus old, /(19) = 5.07, p < .001; new versus recombined, t(\9) = 4.85, p < .001; old versus recombined. /(19) < 1. The values of d' and fi for the recombined nonfamous names were computed by using the proportion of old famous names judged famous as the hit rate, and the proportion of recombined nonfamous names judged famous as the false alarm rate. Hit rates and false alarm rates of 0 and 1, respectively, were treated as in Experiment 1.
As in Experiment 1, subjects judged famous names as famous more quickly if they had been studied previously, /(19) = 5.74, p < .001 (Table 4) . For nonfamous names, response times were similar for the three types of names (new, old, and recombined; all ts < 1.60). The results were identical when these comparisons were based on log transformations of response times.
Performance on the test of recognition memory was good for both famous names (86%) and nonfamous names (83%). The corresponding d' scores were 2.45 ±.18 and 2.18 ± .17.
General Discussion
In two experiments with amnesic patients and normal subjects, we explored the effect of single presentations of famous and nonfamous names on fame judgment and recognition memory. Despite severely impaired recognition memory, amnesic patients were more likely to judge as famous the names they had recently encountered than names they had not encountered. This effect occurred at full strength in the amnesic patients, in other words, the facilitatory effects of prior exposure were similar in amnesic patients and normal subjects. In fact, the facilitatory effect was numerically greater for amnesic patients than control subjects (though not significantly so), raising the possibility that normal subjects might have occasionally inhibited a fame judgment because they recognized a name as one that had just been presented. Amnesic patients would not have been able to recognize the names as having been encountered recently and therefore would not have been able to exercise such censorship.
Results from studies by Jacoby and his colleagues (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby et al, 1989 , Experiment 2) support the idea that normal subjects can use an explicit memory of having encountered a nonfamous name to reduce the tendency to misjudge it as famous. Such censorship is degraded by reducing explicit memory for the list of nonfamous names, for instance, by increasing the length of the delay interval between study and test (Jacoby et al., 1989, Experiment 1) or by dividing attention while subjects are either studying the names or judging their fame (Jacoby et al., 1989 , Experiments 2 and 3). The ability to censor fame judgments by using explicit memory is also diminished in healthy elderly subjects in comparison with that of college students (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990) .
Priming of fame judgments by recent exposure reflects a bias toward judging a name as famous, not a change in discriminability between famous and nonfamous names. This conclusion might seem to contradict the idea that the priming of fame judgments depends on nondeclarative (or nonconscious) memory. Traditional signal detection theory considers & to be a late-stage (i.e., usually conscious) decision or response parameter. However, recent work suggests that repetition priming may generally depend on a perceptual bias effect that occurs at an early stage of processing (Ratcliffe, McKoon, & Verwoerd, 1989 ).
An important finding was that the facilitatory effect of prior study on fame judgments was as large for famous names (11.2% in Experiment 1, 15.5% in Experiment 2) as for nonfamous names (10.2% in Experiment 1, 12.0% in Experiment 2). This result suggests that nondeclarative (implicit) memory can support not only the acquisition of highly specific information (i.e., the names of famous persons) but also the acquisition of information that is unlikely to have a preexisting representation (i.e., nonfamous names). That is, information about unfamiliar names that presumably have no preexisting, unitized representation (e.g., Christine Eitel) can be acquired and can influence subsequent performance.
It seems plausible that the fame judgment effect is based on word priming, that is, on an increased facility for identifying and processing words as a result of their recent presentation. This proposal entails two separate ideas, as follows: (a) Priming can involve the acquisition of new information, not simply the activation of preexisting knowledge; and (b) priming not only improves the ability to identify stimuli but also alters judgments and preferences that involve the same stimuli. That is, changes in judgment and preference are additional, indirect effects of changes in the speed and facility of perceptual processing. The idea that priming is not simply activation is in agreement with a series of findings in normal subjects that show that priming effects following single events are highly specific (Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Masson, 1986; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987) and that they can be produced by novel material (Kroll & Potter, 1984; Musen & Treisman, 1990; Schacter et al., 1990) . In addition, in a recent study, amnesic patients improved their reading speed for repeated nonwords at a normal rate, just as they did for repeated words (Musen & Squire, in press) . Previous failures to find intact perceptual priming of nonwords in amnesic patients (Cermak et al., 1985; Diamond & Rozin, 1984) may have occurred with tasks that allowed normal subjects to use declarative memory strategies (see Musen & Squire, in press ). The idea that priming can alter judgments and preferences follows from several demonstrations that simply presenting faces, shapes, or melodies one or a few times is sufficient to alter judgments about the material in the absence of declarative knowledge about it and without awareness of the basis for the judgments (Bonnano & Stillings, 1986; Johnson et al., 1985; KunstWilson & Zajonc, 1980; Lewicki, 1986; Mandleret al., 1987) .
One source of evidence for the idea that the effect of prior exposure on fame judgments reflects the acquisition of new information is that the effect was as large for nonfamous names as for famous names. Another source of evidence came from further analysis showing that the effect was as large for unusual or uncommon nonfamous names as for names judged usual or common. Independent ratings were obtained by asking 20 subjects (mean age = 62.1 years) who had not participated in any other phase of the study to inspect each nonfamous name and to rate the last name from 1 (very unusual) to 5 (very usual). Subjects were instructed to base their ratings on either of two criteria: similarity to a regular English word or similarity to an already known name of a person or other proper name. The average ratings for the 60 nonfamous names ranged from 1.55 to 4.95. Examples of names rated as unusual were Benjamin Moncrease and Silvio Dirigonne; examples of names rated as usual were Clarence Garrison and Sherry Morton. By using these ratings, we divided the data for each of the control subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 and each of the amnesic patients in Experiment 1 into equal sets: a score for usual names and a score for unusual names.
The results were that the fame judgment effect was as large for unusual names as it was for usual names. Normal subjects judged the new nonfamous names as famous 7.7% of the time if they were unusual and 7.9% of the time if they were usual (amnesic patients: 11.0% vs. 18%; all /s < 1.0). Normal subjects judged the old nonfamous names as famous 15.6% of the time when they were unusual and 20.9% of the time when they were usual, /(33) = 1.55, p > .10; for amnesic patients, 25.9% versus 30.0%, t(9) < 1. These findings provide independent evidence that the fame judgment effect does not depend on the activation of preexisting information.
Recent work provides an anatomical framework for understanding priming and distinguishing it from declarative memory. Studies of visual reading of single words using positron emission tomography (PET) have identified a region in the left visual (extrastriate) cortex that is activated by silent reading of real words and pronounceable nonwords (Petersen, Fox, Snyder, & Raichle, 1990) but not by random letter strings. The finding that a common visual area is activated by words and nonwords suggests an anatomical basis for the finding that famous and nonfamous names produce similar effects. Words are similar to famous names in that both are familiar and both have a preexisting representation: nonwords and nonfamous names are similar in that neither is familiar and neither has a preexisting representation.
Studies using PET have found changes in the right posterior cortex associated with the perceptual priming of words, in a condition in which priming is driven by the visual form of the words (Squire et al, in press ). It has also been suggested that perceptual priming of words and nonwords could occur in a word-form system (Warrington & Shallice, 1980) with a left posterior locus, which stores acquired information about English orthography (Schacter, 1991; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . Priming of famous and nonfamous names seems likely to occur at posterior sites. It is noteworthy that dividing attention during the study phase did not diminish the effect of prior exposure on fame judgments (Jacoby et al., 1989) , which suggests that elaborative, semantic processing is not necessary for the effect. Although additional cortical areas would necessarily be engaged when making fame judgments.
we propose that the initial presentation of famous and nonfamous names produces changes in posterior cortex and that these changes are an important basis for subsequent effects on fame judgments. Thus, as in the direct priming of words and nonwords, the effect of famous and nonfamous names may be presemantic and occur at a relatively early stage of cortical processing, prior to the interaction that occurs between declarative representations and the hippocampus and related structures (for discussion of declarative memory and the medial temporal lobe memory system, see Squire, ZolaMorgan, et al.. 1990; Squire & Zola-Morgan. 1991) .
Finally, in our study, recombining the first and last names of the nonfamous names did not diminish the effect of prior presentation on fame judgments. Thus, in the case of nonfamous names, the facilitating effect of prior presentation cannot have depended on forming a new association between first and last names. This finding is consistent with the view that nondeclarative memory does not readily support the rapid acquisition of new associations . For example, priming of new associations is weak or absent in severely amnesic patients Mayes & Gooding, 1989; however, see Cermak, Blackford, O'Connor, & Bleich, 1988 , for a single-case study) and appears to depend on an essential declarative component. This conclusion accounts for the finding that the ability of amnesic patients to prime new associations is correlated with their residual declarative memory and also accounts for the report that "mildly" amnesic patients exhibit priming of new associations (Schacter & Graf, 1986) .
One likely possibility, considering that on average the first names were relatively common and that the last names were uncommon, is that the facilitator/ effect of previous exposure was based primarily on the last names. Indeed, in the study that first demonstrated the effect of prior exposure on fame judgments (Neely & Payne, 1983) , it was shown that presentation of the last name alone at test elicited a large (25%) increase in fame judgments compared with last names that had not been presented previously. This finding indicates that the influence of recent exposure on fame judgments can be carried by the last name alone. Because first names are seldom identified as famous when they appear in isolation, it seems reasonable to suppose that the fame judgment effect is supported primarily by the last name. Finally, although we found no evidence in this study for the formation of first name-last name associations after a single trial, other recent findings suggest that nondeclarative memory can support the formation of new associations in some circumstances, for example, when multiple learning trials are presented (Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, in press; ; for discussion, see Squire, in press ).
